Abstract-
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential game theory provides a framework to study problems in which a dynamical system is influenced by several individuals, referred to as players [1] - [3] . A wide range of problems can be described in this setting. For example, game theory and differential games have traditionally played an important role in applications related to military and defense, and economics [4] , [5] . Differential games play a role, either as an analysis or design tool, in a variety of other areas, such as biological systems [6] - [9] , power systems [10] - [13] and multi-agent systems [14] , [15] to mention just a few. Moreover, for the special case in which there is only one player, a differential game boils down to a standard optimal control problem, see for example [16] .
Unlike optimal control problems, different solution concepts exist when studying differential game problems: two notable examples are Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium solutions [2] , [3] , [17] . The most common solution concept is the Nash equilibrium solution [1] - [3] , [18] - [20] . Within the context of Nash equilibrium solutions it is assumed that all players are rational, are aware of one another's performance criteria and that all players announce their strategies simultaneously [1] , [2] . Although this solution concept describes a wide range of scenarios, in many practical applications the This work has been conducted as part of the research project "Stability and Control of Power Networks with Energy Storage (STABLE-NET)" which is funded by the RCUK's Energy Programme (contract no: EP/L014343/1).
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A. Astolfi is with the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Imperial College London, London SW7 2AZ, UK and the DICII, Università di Roma "Tor Vergata", Via del Politecnico 1, 00133 Roma, Italy underlying assumption on the required exchange of information is difficult to satisfy. For example, a player may be ignorant about the existence of some or all of the other players or the communication between players may be limited. This becomes important in certain engineering applications in which communication may be expensive or unavailable. In such settings centralised control schemes cannot be adopted and it is necessary to develop distributed control strategies instead [21] . With this motivation it is of interest to adapt the framework provided by differential game theory to deal with problems in which the communication between the players is limited.
In the literature, differential games in which the players have limited sensing abilities, i.e. the case in which the players do not have full information regarding the state of the system, have been studied for different applications. For example, in [22] , [23] pursuit-evasion games with limited sensing ranges are considered. However, there is still a need to explore and formalise problems in which the communication between players is limited. Stackelberg solutions for differential games allow to study problems in which there is a certain hierarchy between the players, i.e. the players announce their strategies in a certain order [19] , [24] . However, in many applications the communication between players may be even more restrictive than this. It is therefore of interest to consider differential games with diverse communication structures.
In this paper we consider differential games in which the communication between agents is described by a time-invariant, directed graph in which nodes represent players and edges represent the existence of a communication link between two players. This graph theoretical approach is similar to what is commonly done when dealing with multi-agent systems with limited communications [25] .
The aim of this work is to develop a framework to formally define and study problems with limited information exchange between the players in a general setting. To do this we identify which information is exchanged between communicating players and which assumptions are made regarding players which do not share a communication link. We are then in a position to define the problem and move towards developing a framework for systematically dealing with differential games with limited communication.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
In Section II the differential game with limited communication is introduced: the term "limited communications" is explained in detail before the problem formulation is defined. In Section III sufficient conditions to solve the differential game are presented both in the nonlinear case and in the linear-quadratic case.
A numerical example involving a multi-agent system is presented to illustrate the results in Section IV. For this particular example, it is shown that, in addition to accommodating for limited communication between the agents, the solution is such that the agents (players) do not need full access to the state. Some concluding remarks and directions for future research are given in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a scenario in which N > 0 players influence a dynamical systems via the selection of their control inputs u i (t) ∈ R mi , i = 1, . . . , N , more commonly referred to as control strategies within the game theoretical framework. The players are denoted by subscripts 1, . . . , N . Moreover, consider the case in which the system is input-affine with the dynamicṡ
where x(t) ∈ R n , with n > 0, is the state of the system, f (x) : R n → R n and g i (x) ∈ R n×mi with m i > 0, for i = 1, . . . , N , are smooth mappings. We assume that the origin is an equilibrium of the system, i.e. f (0) = 0.
Each player selects its control strategy to optimise its own performance criterion which may, or may not, be conflicting with the performance criteria of one or more of the other players. The objective of a player is quantified by a cost functional which it seeks to minimise. In this paper we focus on feedback equilibrium strategies, i.e. u i (t) = u i (x(t)). When considering standard feedback Nash equilibrium solutions it is assumed that all players have information regarding the cost functionals associated with, and strategies adopted by all the other players. Instead, we consider the problem in which the players only communicate information regarding their objectives and strategies to a set of so-called neighbouring agents. We consider the case in which the communication topology is fixed, i.e. it is time invariant.
In this case the communication between the players can be represented by a time-invariant, directed graph consisting of N nodes, labelled i, . . . , N , and a set of edges: each node represents a player and each edge represents a communication link between two players. If player i communicates with player j a directed edge exists from node i to node j and player j is said to be a neighbour of player i. Note that the communication is not necessarily bidirectional, i.e. player j being a neighbour of player i does not imply that player i is a neighbour of player j. Let N i denote the set of players which are neighbours of player i.
1 Let G denote the graph describing the communication topology. In Figure 1 an example of a graph describing the communication topology between a set of 5 players is depicted. The arrows represent the edges and the "direction" of the communication, e.g. the arrow connecting node 3 and node 1 indicates that player 3 shares its information with player 1. In this case, for example, N 1 = {2, 3, 5} and N 2 = {4}. Approaches based on graph theory are frequently used to describe the communication between agents in multi-agent systems as seen, for instance, in [25] and references therein, where also a background on graph theory is provided. For more examples on graph theoretic methods and their applications to multi-agent systems see, for example, [26] , [27] .
Let u j∈N i denote the set of strategies of the neighbours of the i-th player, i.e. u j∈N i = {u j : j ∈ N i }. Given a communication topology, the cost functional 2 of each player is given by
where α i > 0 and α ij are constant parameters, and
In what follows we assume that the following statement holds true
Since the players do not have any information regarding the objectives or strategies of nonneighbouring players, each player must make certain assumptions regarding the strategies of its nonneighbouring players. Suppose that the i-th player assumes that u j (t) =ū ij , for all j = 1, . . . , N and j / ∈ N i . That is, if the j-th player is not a neighbour of the i-th player, the i-th player assumes that the strategy of the j-th player is a certain function of the state x, which we denote byū ij (x). Letū j / ∈N i denote the assumptions the i-th player makes regarding the strategies of nonneighbouring players, i.e.ū j / ∈N i = {ū ij (x) : j / ∈ N i }.
Using this setup the differential game with limited communication can be defined as follows. N } which is such that the origin of the system (1) in closed-loop with u * is (locally) asymptotically stable. Furthermore, u * must satisfy the inequalities
for all u i = u * i such that the the origin of the system (1) in closed-loop with the set of strategies
} is (locally) asymptotically stable, for i = 1, . . . , N .
Remark 1:
The inequalities (3) can be interpreted as follows. If the i-th player assumes u j = u * j for all j ∈ N i and u j =ū ij for all j / ∈ N i , it cannot perform any better by deviating from the strategy u * i . The idea behind this solution is similar to that of Nash equilibrium solutions, but is here recast in a distributed setting.
Note that whereas a standard differential game (when interested in Nash equilibirum solutions) is characterised by the dynamics (1) and the cost functionals (2), for i = 1, . . . , N , the differential game with limited communication is characterised by the graph G describing the communication topology and the set of assumptionsū ij (x), for all j / ∈ N i and i = 1, . . . , N , in addition to the dynamics (1) and the cost functionals (2), for i = 1, . . . , N .
III. SOLUTION TO THE DIFFERENTIAL GAME WITH
LIMITED COMMUNICATION Using dynamic programming and the principle of optimality sufficient conditions for a solution of Problem 1 to exist are given in this section [1] , [28] . The general nonlinear setting is described before the special case of linear-quadratic differential games is considered. For simplicity we consider the case in which α ij ≥ 0 in (2), for j ∈ N i and i = 1, . . . , N .
A. Nonlinear setting
Consider Problem 1 and the system of partial differential equations (PDEs)
where V i (x) : R n → R and V i (0) = 0, for i = 1, . . . , N . 
holds for all x = 0. Then the set of feedback strategies given by
for i = 1, . . . , N , is a solution to Problem 1. Remark 2: The inequality (5) provides a sufficient condition forẆ < 0 for all x = 0. Note that for the case in which there is full communications between all players,ū
for j / ∈ N i and i = 1, . . . , N . In this case the right-handside of the inequality (5) is zero and the inequality is trivially satisfied by Assumption 1.
B. Linear-Quadratic setting
Consider the case in which the dynamics (1) is
B i u i , where A ∈ R n×n and B i ∈ R n×mi , i = 1, . . . , N , are constant matrices, whereas the running costs are quadratic, i.e. they are of the form q i (x) = x Q i x, where Q i ∈ R n×n and Q i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N . In optimal control and standard differential games this linear-quadratic setting leads to the linear regulator problem and linear-quadratic differential games, respectively. Both problems have been extensively studied in the literature: see, for example, [16] , [29] . The reasons for considering this special case are twofold. Firstly, as it is seen with linear regulator problems and standard linear-quadratic differential games, the PDEs (4) can be replaced by algebraic Riccati equations (AREs). Secondly, since these matrix equations are sometimes 3 more readily solved than the PDEs (4) this special case can help provide a better understanding of the condition (5) of Theorem 1.
As is commonly done when considering standard linear-quadratic differential games, see for example [29] , [30] , we limit our attention to linear feedback strategies. Thus, supposeū ij (x) =Ū ij x, whereŪ ij ∈ R n×mj , for i = 1, . . . , N , j / ∈ N i and j = 1, . . . , N . The PDEs (4), i = 1, . . . , N can then be replaced by the algebraic Riccati-like equations
In this special case Theorem 1 reduces the following statement.
Proposition 1: Suppose we can find a solution to the AREs such that
Then the set of linear feedback strategies
i = 1, . . . , N , solves Problem 1.
Remark 3: IfŪ ij = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N , j / ∈ N i and j = 1, . . . , N , (7), i = 1, . . . , N , are standard algebraic Riccati-type equations. In Section IV a problem involving this scenario is considered.
IV. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
To illustrate the theoretical results in Section III a numerical example is presented. In particular a linearquadratic problem which can be interpreted in a multiagent setting is considered.
Consider the case in which N = 3. Each player is an agent described by its position p i (t) ∈ R 2 . Suppose the players satisfy single-integrator dynamics, namelẏ p i = u i , where u i (t) ∈ R 2 is the control strategy of the i-th player. Suppose the first player seeks to reach a target p * 1 ∈ R 2 whereas the remaining two players seek to reach certain distances relative to the first player. The relative distances are defined by the vectors r 12 and r 13 for second and third agents, respectively. Suppose the players share information regarding their objectives and strategies according to the (directed) graph shown in Figure 2 and, furthermore, suppose α i = 1, i = 1, 2, 3 and α ij = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N , j ∈ N i and j = 1, . . . , N .
This scenario is similar in spirit to the problems considered in [15] , albeit here with limited communication. Defining the state as
) the problem can be formulated as the differential game with limited communication characterised by the state dynamicsẋ Figure  2 . Finally it is assumed thatū ij (x) = 0 for all x and for all j / ∈ N i , j = 1, 2, 3 and j = i, for i = 1, 2, 3. Thus the problem can be described as the linear-quadratic differential game considered in Section III-B.
and consider the case in which (7), i = 1, 2, 3. Note that it can easily be seen that the matrices are such that the conditions (8) are satisfied for all i = 1, 2, 3. The linear feedback strategies (9) satisfying (3), for i = 1, 2, 3, are then given by
The running costs can be interpreted as follows. Whereas the first player is only interested in reaching the target p * 1 , the second and third player are interested in reaching the desired positions relative the the first player as well as being interested in the first player reaching the target 5 . This could, for example, be understood in the context of the movement of a formation in which a leader seeks to reach a target for the group, whereas the followers seek to reach the target for the group while reaching and maintaining certain positions relative to the leader. Simulations of the closed-loop system (1)- (9) Figure 3 . Note that the states converge to x = 0 as expected. The trajectories of the players on the x, y-plane, i.e. p 1 (solid line), p 2 (dashed line) and p 3 (dotted line) are shown in Figure  4 . The square and circular markers indicate the initial and final positions of the players, respectively, whereas the arrows indicate the direction of travel. 5 Collisions are not taken into consideration in this example. Consider now a second scenario in which p 1 (0) = (−1, 1) , p 2 (0) = (−5, 5) and p 3 (0) = (−5, −5) , whereas p * 1 , r 12 and r 13 are as in the previous scenario. The trajectories of the three players are shown in Figure  5 where the solid, dashed and dotted lines indicate the first, second and third player, respectively. The square and circular markers indicate the initial and final positions of the players and the arrows indicate the direction of travel.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A differential game with limited communication is considered in this paper: the communication topology is represented by a directed graph. The problem is formally defined and sufficient conditions for a solution are presented in both the general nonlinear setting and the linear-quadratic setting. A numerical example describing a multi-agent system is then introduced to illustrate the results.
Some directions for future research are as follows. It is of interest to derive weaker conditions than that in (5). This is interesting from both a theoretical and practical point-of-view: several applications which can be modeled as in the differential game framework are subject to limited communications and, in some cases, it may be difficult to satisfy the conditions presented in this paper. It is also of interest to study the impact which the communication topology has on how easily a solution to the PDEs (4) (or the AREs (7) in the linear-quadratic case), i = 1, . . . , N , can be found and whether the conditions (5) (or (8) in the linear-quadratic case), i = 1, . . . N , are satisfied. In the first instance, this will be done by considering specific problems and exploring the effect which the communication topology has on these problems. Finally, since closed-form solutions to the PDEs (4), i = 1, . . . , N , are usually not readily obtainable it is desirable to develop methods of systematically constructing approximate solutions, possibly in the spirit of the methods developed in [20] for standard differential games and in [31] for optimal control problems.
